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Abstract
We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism
design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results,
our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and
continuous type spaces.
The key technical barrier preventing exact incentive compatibility in prior black-box reduc-
tions is that repairing violations of incentive constraints requires understanding the distribution
of the mechanism’s output, which is typically #P-hard to compute. Reductions that instead es-
timate the output distribution by sampling inevitably suffer from sampling error, which typically
precludes exact incentive compatibility.
We overcome this barrier by employing and generalizing the computational model in the
literature on Bernoulli Factories. In a Bernoulli factory problem, one is given a function mapping
the bias of an “input coin” to that of an “output coin”, and the challenge is to efficiently simulate
the output coin given only sample access to the input coin. Consider a generalization which we
call the expectations from samples computational model, in which a problem instance is specified
by a function mapping the expected values of a set of input distributions to a distribution over
outcomes. The challenge is to give a polynomial time algorithm that exactly samples from the
distribution over outcomes given only sample access to the input distributions.
In this model, we give a polynomial time algorithm for the function given by exponential
weights: expected values of the input distributions correspond to the weights of alternatives and
we wish to select an alternative with probability proportional to an exponential function of its
weight. This algorithm is the key ingredient in designing an incentive compatible mechanism
for bipartite matching, which can be used to make the approximately incentive compatible
reduction of Hartline et al. (2015) exactly incentive compatible.
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1 Introduction
We resolve a five-year-old open question from Hartline et al. (2011, 2015): There is a polynomial time
reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for
welfare maximization problems.1 The key distinction between our result and those of Hartline et al.
(2011, 2015) is that both (a) the agents’ preferences can be multi-dimensional and from a continuous
space (rather than single-dimensional or from a discrete space), and (b) the resulting mechanism is
exactly Bayesian incentive compatible (rather than approximately Bayesian incentive compatible).
A mechanism solicits preferences from agents, i.e., how much each agent prefers each outcome,
and then chooses an outcome. Incentive compatibility of a mechanism requires that, though agents
could misreport their preferences, it is not in any agent’s best interest to do so. A quintessen-
tial research problem at the intersection of mechanism deign and approximation algorithms is to
identify black-box reductions from approximation mechanism design to approximation algorithm
design. The key algorithmic property that makes a mechanism incentive compatible is that, from
any individual agent’s perspective, it must be maximal-in-range, specifically, the outcome selected
maximizes the agent’s utility less some cost that is a function of the outcome (e.g., this cost function
can depend on other agents’ reported preferences.).
The black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design in the
literature are based on obtaining an understanding of the distribution of outcomes produced by
the algorithm through simulating the algorithm on samples from agents’ preferences. Notice that,
even for structurally simple problems, calculating the exact probability that a given outcome is
selected by an algorithm can be #P-hard. For example, Hartline et al. (2015) show such a result
for calculating the probability that a matching in a bipartite graph is optimal, for a simple explicitly
given distribution of edge weights. On the other hand, a black-box reduction for mechanism design
must produce exactly maximal-in-range outcomes merely from samples. This challenge motivates
new questions for algorithm design from samples.
The Expectations from Samples Model. In traditional algorithm design, the inputs are spec-
ified to the algorithm exactly. In this paper, we formulate the expectations from samples model.
This model calls for drawing an outcome from a distribution that is a precise function of the ex-
pectations of some random sources that are given only by sample access. Formally, a problem for
this model is described by a function f : [0, 1]n → ∆(X) where X is an abstract set of feasible
outcomes and ∆(X) is the family of probability distributions over X. For any n input distributions
on support [0, 1] with unknown expectations µ = (µ1, . . . , µn), an algorithm for such a problem,
with only sample access to each of the n input distributions, must produce sample outcome from
X that is distributed exactly according to f(µ1, . . . , µn).
Producing an outcome that is approximately drawn according to the desired distribution can
typically be done from estimates of the expectations formed from sample averages (a.k.a., Monte
Carlo sampling). On the other hand, exact implementation of many natural functions f is either
impossible for information theoretic reasons or requires sophisticated techniques. Impossibility
generally follows, for example, when f is discontinuous. The literature on Bernoulli Factories (e.g.,
Keane and O’Brien, 1994), which inspires our generalization to the expectations from samples model
and provides some of the basic building blocks for our results, considers the special case where the
input distribution and output distribution are both Bernoullis (i.e., supported on {0, 1}).
We propose and solve two fundamental problems for the expectations from samples model. The
1A Bayesian algorithm is one that performs well in expectation when the input is drawn from a known distribution.
By polynomial time, we mean polynomial in the number of agents and the combined “size” of their type spaces.
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first problem considers the biases p = (p1, . . . , pm) of m Bernoulli random variables as the marginal
probabilities of a distribution on {1, . . . ,m} (i.e., p satisfies ∑i pi = 1) and asks to sample from
this distribution. We develop an algorithm that we call the Bernoulli Race to solve this problem.
The second problem corresponds to the “soft maximum” problem given by a regularizer that is a
multiple 1/λ of the Shannon entropy function H(p) = −∑i pi log pi. The marginal probabilities on
outcomes that maximize the expected value of the distribution over outcomes plus the entropy reg-
ularizer are given by exponential weights,2 i.e., the function outputs i with probability proportional
to eλpi . A straightforward exponentiation and then reduction to the Bernoulli Race above does not
have polynomial sample complexity. We develop an algorithm that we call the Fast Exponential
Bernoulli Race to solve this problem.
Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design. A special case of the problem that we must
solve to apply the standard approach to black-box reductions is the single-agent multiple-urns
problem. In this setting, a single agent faces a set X of urns, and each urn contains a random object
whose distribution is unknown, but can be sampled. The agent’s type determines his utility for
each object; fixing this type, urn i is associated with a random real-valued reward with unknown
expectation µi. Our goal is to allocate the agent his favorite urn, or close to it.
As described above, incentive compatibility requires an algorithm for selecting a high-value urn
that is maximal-in-range. If we could exactly calculate the expected values µ1, . . . , µn from the
agent’s type, this problem is trivial both algorithmically and from a mechanism design perspective:
simply solicit the agent’s type t then allocate him the urn with the maximum µi = µi(t). As
described above, with only sample access to the expected values of each urn, we cannot implement
the exact maximum. Our solution is to apply the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race as a solution to
the regularized maximization problem in the expectations from samples model. This algorithm –
with only sample access to the agent’s values for each urn – will assign the agent to a random urn
with a high expected value and is maximal-in-range.
The multi-agent reduction from Bayesian mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design of
Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) is based on solving a matching problem between multiple agents and
outcomes, where an agent’s value for an outcome is the expectation of a random variable which
can be accessed only through sampling.3 Specifically, this problem generalizes the above-described
single-agent multiple-urns problem to the problem of matching agents to urns with the goal of
approximately maximizing the total weight of the matching (the social welfare). Again, for incentive
compatibility we require this expectations from samples algorithm to be maximal-in-range from each
agent’s perspective. Using methods from Agrawal and Devanur’s (2015) work on stochastic online
convex optimization, we reduce this matching problem to the single-agent multiple-urns problem.
As stated in the opening paragraph, our main result – obtained through the approach outlined
above – is a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to
Bayesian algorithm design. The analysis assumes that agents’ values are normalized to the [0, 1]
interval and gives additive loss in the welfare. The reduction is an approximation scheme and
the dependence of the runtime on the additive loss is inverse polynomial. The reduction depends
polynomially on a suitable notion of the size of the space of agent preferences. For example, applied
to environments where agents have preferences that lie in high-dimensional spaces, the runtime of
the reduction depends polynomially on the number of points necessary to approximately cover each
agent’s space of preferences. More generally, the bounds we obtain are polynomial in the bounds of
2This is a standard relationship that has, for example, been employed in previous work in mechanism design (e.g.,
Huang and Kannan, 2012).
3Bei and Huang (2011) independently discovered a similar reduction based on solving a fractional assignment
problem. Their reduction applies to finite, discrete type spaces and is approximately Bayesian incentive compatible.
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Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) but the resulting mechanism, unlike in the proceeding work, is exactly
Bayesian incentive compatible.
Organization. The organization of the paper separates the development of the expectations from
samples model and its application to black-box reductions in Bayesian mechanism design. Section 2
introduces Bernoulli factories and reviews basic results from the literature. Section 3 defines two
central problems in the expectations from samples model, sampling from outcomes with linear
weights and sampling from outcomes with exponential weights, and gives algorithms for solving
them. We return to mechanism design problems in Section 4 and solve the single-agent multiple
urns problem. In Section 5 we give our main result, the reduction from Bayesian mechanism design
to Bayesian algorithm design.
2 Basics of Bernoulli Factories
We use the terms Bernoulli and coin to refer to distributions over {1, 0} and {heads, tails},
interchangeably. The Bernoulli factory problem is about generating new coins from old ones.
Definition 2.1 (Keane and O’Brien, 1994). Given function f : (0, 1)→ (0, 1), the Bernoulli factory
problem is to output a sample of a Bernoulli variable with bias f(p) (i.e. an f(p)-coin), given black-
box access to independent samples of a Bernoulli distribution with bias p ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. a p-coin).
To illustrate the Bernoulli factory model, consider the examples of f(p) = p2 and f(p) = ep−1.
For the former one, it is enough to flip the p-coin twice and output 1 if both flips are 1, and 0
otherwise. For the latter one, the Bernoulli factory is still simple but more interesting: draw K
from the Poisson distribution with parameter λ = 1, flip the p-coin K times and output 1 if all coin
flips where 1, and 0 otherwise (see below).4
The question of characterizing functions f for which there is an algorithm for sampling f(p)-
coins from p-coins has been the main subject of interest in this literature (Keane and O’Brien, 1994;
Nacu and Peres, 2005). In particular, Keane and O’Brien (1994) provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for f under which a Bernoulli factory exists. Moreover, Nacu and Peres (2005) suggests
an algorithm for simulating an f(p)-coin based on polynomial envelopes of f . The canonical chal-
lenging problem of Bernoulli factories – and a primitive in the construction of more general Bernoulli
factories – is the Bernoulli Doubling problem: f(p) = 2p for p ∈ (0, 1/2). See Łatuszyński (2010)
for a survey on this topic.
Questions in Bernoulli factories can be generalized to multiple input coins. Given f : (0, 1)m →
(0, 1), the goal is sample from a Bernoulli with bias f(p1, . . . , pm) given sample access to m in-
dependent Bernoulli variables with unknown biases p = (p1, . . . , pm). Linear functions f were
studied and solved by Huber (2015). For example, the special case m = 2 and f(p1, p2) = p1 + p2,
a.k.a., Bernoulli Addition, can be solved by reduction to the Bernoulli Doubling problem (formalized
below).
Questions in Bernoulli factories can be generalized to allow input distributions over real numbers
on the unit interval [0, 1] (rather than Bernoullis over {0, 1}). In this generalization the question is
to produce a Bernoulli with bias f(µ) with sample access to draws from a distribution supported on
[0, 1] with expectation µ. These problems can be easily solved by reduction to the Bernoulli factory
problem:
0. Continuous to Bernoulli: Can implement Bernoulli with bias µ with one sample from distri-
bution D with expectation µ. Algorithm:
4The Poisson distribution with parameter λ has probability of K = k as λke−λ/k!.
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• Draw Z ∼ D and P ∼ Bern[Z].
• Output P .
Below are enumerated the important building blocks for Bernoulli factories.
1. Bernoulli Down Scaling: Can implement f(p) = λ · p for λ ∈ [0, 1] with one sample from
Bern[p]. Algorithm:
• Draw Λ ∼ Bern[λ] and P ∼ Bern[p].
• Output Λ · P (i.e., 1 if both coins are 1, otherwise 0).
2. Bernoulli Doubling: Can implement f(p) = 2p for p ∈ (0, 1/2 − δ] with O(1/δ) samples from
Bern[p] in expectation. The algorithm is complicated, see Nacu and Peres (2005).
3. Bernoulli Probability Generating Function: Can implement f(p) = EK∼D
[
pK
]
for distribution
D over non-negative integers with EK∼D[K] samples from Bern[p] in expectation. Algorithm:
• Draw K ∼ D and P1, . . . , PK ∼ Bern[p] (i.e., K samples).
• Output ∏i Pi (i.e., 1 if all K coins are 1, otherwise 0).
4. Bernoulli Exponentiation: Can implement f(p) = exp(λ(p−1)) for p ∈ [0, 1] and non-negative
constant λ with λ samples from Bern[p] in expectation. Algorithm: Apply the Bernoulli
Probability Generating Function algorithm for the Poisson distribution with parameter λ.
5. Bernoulli Averaging: Can implement f(p1, p2) = (p1 + p2)/2 with one sample from Bern[p1]
or Bern[p2]. Algorithm:
• Draw Z ∼ Bern[1/2], P1 ∼ Bern[p1], and P2 ∼ Bern[p2].
• Output PZ+1.
6. Bernoulli Addition: Can implement f(p1, p2) = p1 + p2 for p1 + p2 ∈ [0, 1 − δ] with O(1/δ)
samples from Bern[p1] and Bern[p2] in expectation. Algorithm: Apply Bernoulli Doubling to
Bernoulli Averaging.
It may seem counterintuitive that Bernoulli Doubling is much more challenging that Bernoulli
Down Scaling. Notice, however, that for a coin with bias p = 1/2, Bernoulli Doubling with a finite
number of coin flips is impossible. The doubled coin must be deterministically heads, while any
finite sequence of coin flips of Bern[1/2] has non-zero probability of occuring. On the other hand a
coin with probability p = 1/2 − δ for some small δ has a similar probability of each sequence but
Bernoulli Doubling must sometimes output tails. Thus, Bernoulli Doubling must require a number
of coin flips that goes to infinity as δ goes to zero.
3 The Expectations from Samples Model
The expectations from samples model is a combinatorial generalization of the Bernoulli factory
problem. The goal is to select an outcome from a distribution that is a function of the expectations
of a set of input distributions. These input distributions can be accessed only by sampling.
Definition 3.1. Given function f : (0, 1)n → ∆(X) for domain X, the expectations from samples
problem is to output a sample from f(µ) given black-box access to independent samples from n
distributions supported on [0, 1] with expectations µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ (0, 1)n.
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Without loss of generality, by the Continuous to Bernoulli construction of Section 2, the input
random variables can be assumed to be Bernoullis and, thus, this expectations of samples model can
be viewed as a generalization of the Bernoulli factory question to output spaces X beyond {0, 1}. In
this section we propose and solve two fundamental problems for the expectations of samples model.
In these problems the outcomes are the a finite set of m outcomes X = {1, . . . ,m} and the input
distributions are m Bernoulli distributions with biases p = (p1, . . . , pm).
In the first problem, biases correspond to the marginal probabilities with which each of the
outcomes should be selected. The goal is to produce random i from X so that the probability of i
is exactly its marginal probability pi. More generally, if the biases do not sum to one, this problem
is equivalently the problem of random selection with linear weights.
The second problem we solve corresponds to a regularized maximization problem, or specifically
random selection from exponential weights. For this problem the baiases of the m Bernoulli input
distributions correspond to the weights of the outcomes. The goal is to produce a random i from X
according to the distribution given by exponential weights, i.e., the probability of selecting i from
X is eλpi/
∑
j e
λpj .
3.1 Random Selection with Linear Weights
Definition 3.2 (Random Selection with Linear Weights). The random selection with linear
weights problem is to sample from the probability distribution f(v) defined by PrI∼f(v)[I = i] =
vi/
∑
j vj for each i in {1, . . . ,m} with only sample access to distributions with expectations v =
(v1, . . . , vm).
We solve the random selection with linear weights problem by an algorithm that we call the
Bernoulli race (Algorithm 1). The algorithm repeatedly picks a coin uniformly at random and flips
it. The winning coin is the first one to come up heads in this process.
Algorithm 1 Bernoulli Race
1: input sample access to m coins with biases v1, . . . , vm.
2: loop
3: Draw I uniformly from {1, . . . ,m} and draw P from input distribution I.
4: If P is heads then output I and halt.
5: end loop
Theorem 3.1. The Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 1) samples with linear weights (Definition 3.2) with
an expected m/
∑
i vi samples from input distributions with biases v1, . . . , vn.
Proof. At each iteration, the algorithm terminates if the flipped coin outputs 1 and iterates other-
wise. Since the coin is chosen uniformly at random, the probability of termination at each iteration
is 1m
∑
i vi. The total number of iterations (and number of samples) is therefore a geometric random
variable with expectation m/
∑
i vi.
The selected outcome also follows the desired distribution, as shown below.
Pr[i is selected] =
∞∑
k=1
Pr[i is selected at time k] Pr[algorithm reaches time k]
=
vi
m
∞∑
k=1
(
1− 1
m
∑
j
vj
)k−1
=
vi
m
1
m
∑
j vj
=
vi∑
j vj
.
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3.2 Random Selection with Exponential Weights
Definition 3.3 (Random Selection with Exponential Weights). For parameter λ > 0, the
random selection with exponential weights problem is to sample from the probability distribution
f(v) defined by PrI∼f(v)[I = i] = exp(λvi)/
∑
j exp(λvj) for each i in {1, . . . ,m} with only sample
access to distributions with expectations v = (v1, . . . , vm).
The Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race, below, samples from the exponential weights distribution.
The algorithm follows the paradigm of picking one of the input distributions, exponentiating it,
sampling from the exponentiated distribution, and repeating until one comes up heads. While this
algorithm does not generally run in polynomial time, it is a building block for one that does.
Algorithm 2 The Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race (with parameter λ > 0)
1: input Sample access to m coins with biases v1, . . . , vm.
2: For each i, apply Bernoulli Exponentiation to coin i to produce coin with bias v˜i = exp(λ(vi − 1)).
3: Run the Bernoulli Race on the coins with biases v˜ = (v˜1, . . . , v˜m).
Theorem 3.2. The Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 2) samples with exponential
weights (Definition 3.3) with an expected λmeλ(1−vmax) samples from input distributions with bi-
ases v1, . . . , vn and vmax = maxi vi.
Proof. The correctness and runtime follows from the correctness and runtimes of Bernoulli Expo-
nentiation and the Bernoulli Race.
3.3 The Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race
Sampling from exponential weights is typically used as a “soft maximum” where the parameter λ
controls how close the selected outcome is to the true maximum. For such an application, exponential
dependence on λ in the runtime would be prohibitive. Unfortunately, when vmax is bounded away
from one, the runtime of the Basic Logistic Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 2; Theorem 3.2) is exponential
in λ. A simple observation allows allows the resolution of this issue: the exponential weights
distribution is invariant to any uniform additive shift of all weights. This section applies this idea
to develop the Fast Logistic Bernoulli Race.
Observe that for any given parameter ǫ, we can easily implement a Bernoulli random variable Z
whose bias z is within an additive ǫ of vmax. Note that, unlike the other algorithms in this section,
a precise relationship between z and v1, . . . , vm is not required.
Lemma 3.3. For parameter ǫ ∈ (0, 1], there is an algorithm for sampling from a Bernoulli random
variable with bias z ∈ [vmax − ǫ, vmax + ǫ], where vmax = maxi vi, with O(mǫ2 · log(mǫ )) samples from
input distributions with biases v1, . . . , vm.
Proof. The algorithm is as follows: Sample 4
ǫ2
log(4mǫ ) times from each of the m coins, let vˆi be the
empirical estimate of coin i’s bias obtained by averaging, then apply the Continuous to Bernoulli
algorithm (Section 2) to map vˆmax = maxi vˆi to a Bernoulli random variable.
Standard tail bounds imply that |vˆmax − vmax| < ǫ/2 with probability at least 1 − ǫ/2, and
therefore z = E[vˆmax] ∈ [vmax − ǫ, vmax + ǫ].
Since we are interested in a fast logistic Bernoulli race as λ grows large, we restrict attention
to λ > 4. We set ǫ = 1/λ in the estimation of vmax (by Lemma 3.3). This estimate will be used
to boost the bias of each distribution in the input so that the maximum bias is at least 1 − 3ǫ.
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The boosting of the bias is implemented with Bernoulli Addition which, to be fast, requires the
cumulative bias be bounded away from one. Thus, the probabilities are scaled down by a factor
of 1 − 2ǫ, this scaling is subsequently counterbalanced by adjusting the parameter λ. The formal
details are given below.
Algorithm 3 Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (with parameter λ > 4)
1: input Sample access to m coins with biases v1, . . . , vm.
2: Let ǫ = 1/λ.
3: Construct a coin with bias z ∈ [vmax − ǫ, vmax + ǫ] (from Lemma 3.3).
4: Apply Bernoulli Down Scaling to a coin with bias 1− z to implement a coin with bias (1− 2ǫ)(1− z).
5: For all i, apply Bernoulli Down Scaling to implement a coin with bias (1− 2ǫ)vi.
6: For all i, apply Bernoulli Addition to implement coin with bias v′i = (1− 2ǫ)vi + (1− 2ǫ)(1− z).
7: Run the Basic Exponential Bernoulli Race with parameter λ′ = λ1−2ǫ on the coins with bias v
′
1, . . . , v
′
m.
Theorem 3.4. The Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3) samples with exponential weights
(Definition 3.3) with an expected O(λ4m2 log(λm)) samples from the input distributions.
Proof. The correctness and runtime follows from the correctness and runtimes of the Basic Expo-
nential Bernoulli Race, Bernoulli Doubling, Lemma 3.3 (for estimate of vmax), and the facts that
λ′v′i = λ(vi + 1− z) and that the distribution given by exponential weights is invariant to additive
shifts of all weights.
A detailed analysis of the runtime follows. Since the algorithm builds a number of sampling
subroutines in a hierarchy, we analyze the runtime of the algorithm and the various subroutines
in a bottom up fashion. Steps 3 and 4 implement a coin with bias (1 − 2ǫ)(1 − z) with runtime
O(λ2m · log(λm)) per sample, as per the bound of Lemma 3.3. The coin implemented in Step 5 is
sampled in constant time. Observe that v′i ≤ (1− 2ǫ)(1 + vi− vmax+ ǫ) ≤ 1− ǫ, and the runtime of
Bernoulli Doubling implies that O(λ) samples from the coins of Steps 4 and 5 suffice for sampling
Bern[v′i]; we conclude that a v
′
i-coin can be sampled in time O(λ
3m · log(λm)). Finally, note that
for v′max = maxi v′i, we have v
′
max ≥ 1 − 3ǫ; Theorem 3.2 then implies that the Basic Exponential
Bernoulli Race samples at most λ′meλ′ 3ǫ ≤ 2e6λm = O(λm) times from the v′-coins; we conclude
the claimed runtime.
4 The Single-Agent Multiple-Urns Problem
We investigate incentive compatible mechanism design for the single-agent multiple-urns problem.
Informally, mechanism is needed to assign an agent to one of many urns. Each urn contains objects
and the agent’s value for being assigned to an urn is taken in expectation over objects from the urn.
The problem asks for an incentive compatible mechanism with good welfare (i.e., the value of the
agent for the assigned urn).
4.1 Problem Definition and Notations
A single agent with type t from type space T desires an object o from outcome space O. The agent’s
value for an outcome o is a function of her type t and denoted by v(t, o) ∈ [0, 1]. The agent is a
risk-neutral quasi-linear utility maximizer with utility Eo[v(t, o)]− p for randomized outcome o and
expected payment p. There are m urns. Each urn j is given by a distribution Dj over outcomes in
O. If the agent is assigned to urn j she obtains an object from the urn’s distribution Dj .
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A mechanism can solicit the type of the agent (who may misreport if she desires). We further
assume (1) the mechanism has black-box access to evaluate v(t, o) for any type t and outcome o,
(2) the mechanism has sample access to the distribution Dj of each urn j. The mechanism may
draw objects from urns and evaluate the agent’s reported value for these objects, but then must
ultimately assign the agent to a single urn and charge the agent a payment. The urn and payment
that the agent is assigned are random variables in the mechanism’s internal randomization and
randomness from the mechanisms potential samples from the urns’ distributions.
The distribution of the urn the mechanism assigns to an agent, as a function of her type t,
is denoted by x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xm(t)) where xj(t) is the marginal probability that the agent is
assigned to urn j. Denote the expected value of the agent for urn j by vj(t) = Eo∼Dj [v(t, o)].
The expected welfare of the mechanism is
∑
j vj(t)xj(t). The expected payment of this agent is
denoted by p(t). The agent’s utility for the outcome and payment of the mechanism is given by∑
j vj(t)xj(t) − p(t). Incentive compatibility is defined by the agent with type t preferring her
outcome and payment to that assigned to another type t′.
Definition 4.1. A single-agent mechanism (x, p) is incentive compatible if, for all t, t′ ∈ T :
∑
j
vj(t)xj(t)− p(t) ≥
∑
j
vj(t)xj(t
′)− p(t′) (1)
A multi-agent mechanism is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if equation (1) holds for the
outcome of the mechanism in expectation of the truthful reports of the other agents.
4.2 Incentive Compatible Approximate Scheme
If the agent’s expected value for each urn is known, or equivalently mechanism designer knows the
distributions Dj for all urns j rather than only sample access, this problem would be easy and
admits a trivial optimal mechanism: simply select the urn maximizing the agent’s expected value
vj(t) according to her reported type t, and charge her a payment of zero. What makes this problem
interesting is that the designer is restricted to only sample the agent’s value for an urn. In this
case, the following Monte-carlo adaptation of the trivial mechanism is tempting: sample from each
urn sufficiently many times to obtain a close estimate v˜j(t) of vj(t) with high probability (up to
any desired precision δ > 0), then choose the urn j maximizing v˜j(t) and charge a payment of zero.
This mechanism is not incentive compatible, as illustrated by a simple example.
Example Consider two urns. Urn A contains only outcome o2, whereas B two contains a mixture
of outcomes o1 and o3, with o1 slightly more likely than o3. Now consider an agent who has (true)
values 1, 2, and 3 for outcomes o1, o2, and o3 respectively. If this agent reports her true type, the
trivial Monte-carlo mechanism — instantiated with any desired finite degree of precision — assigns
her urn A most of the time, but assigns her urn B with some nonzero probability. The agent gains
by misreporting her value of outcome o3 as 0, since this guarantees her preferred urn A.
The above example might seem counter-intuitive, since the trivial Monte-carlo mechanism ap-
pears to be doing its best to maximize the agent’s utility, up to the limits of (unavoidable) sampling
error. One intuitive rationalization is the following: an agent can slightly gain by procuring (by
whatever means) more precise information about the distributions Dj than that available to the
mechanism, and using this information to guide her strategic misreporting of her type. This raises
the following question:
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Question: Is there an incentive-compatible mechanism for the single-agent multiple-urns problem
which achieves welfare within ǫ of the optimal, and samples only poly(m, 1ǫ ) times (in expectation)
from the urns?
We resolve the above question in the affirmative. We present approximation scheme for this
problem that is based on our solution to the problem of random selection with exponential weights
(Section 3.2). The solution to the single-agent multiple-urns problem is a main ingredient in the
Bayesian mechanism that we propose in Section 5 as our black-box reduction mechanism.
To explain the approximate scheme, we start by recalling the following standard theorem in
mechanism design.
Theorem 4.1. For outcome rule x, there exists payment rule p so that single-agent mechanism (x, p)
is incentive compatible if and only if x is maximal in range, i.e., x(t) ∈ argmaxx′
∑
j vj(t)x
′
j−c(x′),
for some cost function c(·).5
The payments that satisfy Theorem 4.1 can be easily calculated with black-box access to outcome
rule x(·). For a single-agent problem, this payment can be calculated in two calls to the function
x(·), one on the agent’s reported type t and the other on a type randomly drawn from the path
between the origin and t. Further discussion and details are given in Appendix A. It suffices,
therefore, to identify a mechanism that samples from urns and assigns the agent to an urn that
induces an outcome rule x(·) that is good for welfare, i.e., ∑i vj(t)xj(t), and is maximal in range.
The following theorem solves the problem.
Theorem 4.2. There is an incentive-compatible mechanism for the single-agent multiple-urns prob-
lem which achieves an additive ǫ-approximation to the optimal welfare in expectation, and runs in
time O(m2( logmǫ )
5) in expectation.
Proof. Consider the problem of selecting a distribution over urns to optimize welfare plus (a scaling
of) the Shannon entropy function, i.e., x(t) = argmaxx′ vj(t)x
′
j − (1/λ)
∑
j x
′
j log x
′
j .
6 It is well
known that the optimizer x(t) is given by exponential weights, i.e., the marginal probability of
assigning the jth urn is given by xj(t) = exp(λvj(t))/
∑
j′ exp(λvj′(t)). In Section 3.3 we gave a
polynomal time algorithm for sampling from exponential weights, specifically, the Fast Exponential
Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3). Proper choice of the parameter λ trades off faster runimes with
increased welfare loss due to entropy term. The entropy is maximized at the uniform distribution
x′ = (1/m, . . . , 1/m) with entropy logm. Thus, choosing λ = logm/ǫ guarantees that the welfare
is within an additive ǫ of the optimal welfare maxj vj(t). The bound of the theorem then follows
from the analysis of the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Theorem 3.4) with this choice of λ.
5 A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Black-box Reduction
A central question at the interface between algorithms and economics is on the existence of black-
box reductions for mechanism design. Given black-box access to any algorithm that maps inputs
to outcomes, can a mechanism be constructed that (a) induces agents to truthfully report the
inputs and (b) produces an outcome that is as good as the one produced by the algorithm? The
mechanism must be computationally tractable, specifically, making no more than a polynomial
number of elementary operations and black-box calls to the algorithm.
5The “only if” direction of this theorem requires that the type space T be rich enough so that the induced space
of values across the urns is {(v1(t), . . . , vm(t)) : t ∈ T } = [0, 1]
m.
6The additive entropy term can be interpreted as a negative cost vis-à-vis Theorem 4.1.
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A line of research initiated by Hartline and Lucier (2010, 2015) demonstrated that, for the wel-
fare objective, Bayesian black-box reductions exist. In the Bayesian setting, agents’ types are drawn
from a distribution. The algorithm is assumed to obtain good welfare for types from this distribu-
tion. The constructed mechanism is an approximation scheme; For any ǫ it gives a mechanism that
is Bayesian incentive compatible (Definition 4.1) and obtains a welfare that is at least an additive
ǫ form the algorithms welfare. Before formalizing this problem, for further details on Bayesian
mechanism design and our set of notations in this paper, which are based on those in Hartline et al.
(2015), we refer the reader to Appendix B.
Definition 5.1 (BIC black-box reduction problem). Given black-box oracle access to an allocation
algorithm A, construct an allocation algorithm A˜ that is Bayesian incentive compatible; approxi-
mately preserves welfare, i.e., any agent’s expected welfare under A˜ is at least that under A less ǫ;
and runs in polynomial time in n and 1/ǫ.
In this literature, Hartline and Lucier (2010, 2015) solve the case of single-dimensional agents
and Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) solve the case of multi-dimensional agents with discrete type spaces.
For the relaxation of the problem where only approximate incentive compatibility is required,
Bei and Huang (2011) solve the case of multi-dimensional agents with discrete type space, and
Hartline et al. (2011, 2015) solve the general case. These reductions are approximation schemes
that are polynomial in the number of agents, the desired approximation factor, and a measure of
the size of the agents’ type spaces (e.g., its dimension).
5.1 Surrogate Selection and the Replica-Surrogate Matching
A main conclusion of the literature on Bayesian reductions for mechanism design is that the multi-
agent problem of reducing Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design, itself, reduces to a single-
agent problem of surrogate selection. Consider any agent in the original problem and the induced
algorithm with the inputs form other agents hardcoded as random draws from their respective type
distributions. The induced algorithm maps the type of this agent to a distribution over outcomes.
If this distribution over outcomes is maximal-in-range then there exists payments for which the
induced algorithm is incentive compatible (Theorem 4.1). If not, the problem of surrogate selection
is to map the type of the agent to an input to the algorithm to satisfy three properties:
(a) The composition of surrogate selection and the induced algorithm is maximal-in-range,
(b) The composition approximately preserves welfare,
(c) The surrogate selection preserves the type distribution.
Condition (c), a.k.a. stationarity, implies that fixing the non-maximaility-of-range of the algorithm
for a particular agent does not affect the outcome for any other agents. With such an approach
each agent’s incentive problem can be resolved independently from that of other agents.
Theorem 5.1 (Hartline et al., 2015). The composition of an algorithm with a profile of surrogate
selection rules satisfying conditions (a)–(c) is Bayesian incentive compatible and approximately pre-
serves the algorithm’s welfare (the loss in welfare is the sum of the losses in welfare of each surrogate
selection rule).
The surrogate selection rule of Hartline et al. (2015) is based on setting up a matching problem
between random types from the distribution (replicas) and the outcomes of the algorithm on random
types from the distribution (surrogates). The true type of the agent is one of the replicas, and
10
the surrogate selection rule outputs the surrogate to which this replica is matched. This approach
addresses the three properties of surrogate selection rules as (a) if the matching selected is maximal-
in-range then the composition of the surrogate selection rule with the induced algorithm is maximal-
in-range, (b) the welfare of the matching is the welfare of the reduction and the optimal matching
approximates the welfare of the original algorithm, and (c) any maximal matching gives a stationary
surrogate selection rule. For a detailed discussion on why maximal-in-range matching will result in
a BIC mechanism after composing the corresponding surrogate selection rule with the allocation
algorithm, we refer the interested reader to Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.2 in Appendix C.
Definition 5.2. The replica-surrogate matching surrogate selection rule; for a k-to-1 matching
algorithm M , a integer market size m, and load k; maps a type t to a surrogate type as follows:
1. Pick the real-agent index i∗ uniformly at random from {1, . . . , km}.
2. Define the replica type profile r, an km-tuple of types by setting ri∗ = t and sampling the
remaining km− 1 replica types r−i∗ i.i.d. from the type distribution F .
3. Sample the surrogate type profile s, an m-tuple of i.i.d. samples from the type distribution F .
4. Run matching algorithm M on the complete bipartite graph between replicas and surrogates.
5. Output the surrogate j∗ that is matched to i∗.
The value that a replica obtains for the outcome that the induced algorithm produces for a
surrogate, henceforth, surrogate outcome, is a random variable. The analysis of Hartline et al.
(2015) is based on the study of an ideal computational model where the value of any replica for any
surrogate outcome Eo∼A(sj)[v(ri, o)] is known exactly. In this computationally-unrealistic model
and with these values as weights, the maximum weight matching algorithm can be employed in
the replica-surrogate matching surrogate selection rule above, and it results in a Bayesian incentive
compatible mechanism. Hartline et al. (2015) analyze the welfare of the resulting mechanism in the
case where the load is k = 1, prove that conditions (a)-(c) are satisfied, and give (polynomial)
bounds on the size m that is necessary for the expected welfare of the mechanism to be an additive
ǫ from that of the algorithm.
Remark Given a BIC allocation algorithm A˜ through a replica-surrogate matching surrogate se-
lection, the payments that satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility can be easily calculated with
black-box access to A˜ (see Appendix A).
If M is maximum matching, conditions (a)-(c) clearly continue to hold for our generalization to
load k > 1. Moreover, the welfare of the reduction is monotone non-decreasing in k.
Lemma 5.2. In the ideal computational model (where the value of a replica for being matched to
a surrogate is given exactly) the per-replica welfare of the replica-surrogate maximum matching is
monotone non-decreasing in load k.
Proof. Consider a non-optimal matching that groups replicas into k groups of size m and finds the
optimal 1-to-1 matching between replicas in each group and the surrogates. As these are random
(k = 1)−matchings, the expected welfare of each such matching is equal to the expected welfare
of the (k = 1)−matching. These matchings combine to give a feasible matching between the mk
replicas and m surrogates. The total expected welfare of the optimal k-to-1 matching between
replicas and surrogates is no less than k times the expected welfare of the (k = 1)−matching. Thus,
the per-replica welfare, i.e., normalized by mk, is monotone in k.
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Our main result is an approximation scheme for the ideal reduction of Hartline et al. (2015).
We identify a k > 1 and a polynomial time (in m and 1/ǫ) k-to-1 matching algorithm for the
black-box model and prove that the expected welfare of this matching algorithm (per-replica) is
within an additive ǫ of the expected welfare per-replica of the optimal matching in the ideal model
with load k = 1 (as analyzed by Hartline et al., 2015). The welfare of the ideal model is monotone
non-decreasing in load k (Lemma 5.2); therefore it will be sufficient to identify a polynomial load
k where there is a polynomial time algorithm in the black-box model that has ǫ loss relative to the
ideal model for that same load k.
In the remainder of this section we replace this ideal matching algorithm with an approximation
scheme for the black-box model where replica values for surrogate outcomes can only be estimated
by sampling. For any ǫ our algorithm gives an ǫ additive loss of the welfare of the ideal algorithm
with only a polynomial increase to the runtime. Moreover, the algorithm produces a perfect (and
so maximal) matching, and therefore the surrogate selection rule is stationary; and the algorithm is
maximal-in-range for any replica (including the true type of the agent), and therefore the resulting
mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible.
5.2 Entropy Regularized Matching
In this section we define an entropy regularized bipartite matching problem and discuss its solution.
We will refer to the left-hand-side vertices as replicas and the right-hand-side vertices as surrogates.
The weights on the edge between replica i ∈ {1, . . . , km} and surrogate j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} will be
denoted by vi,j. In our application to the replica-surrogate matching defined in the previous section,
the weights will be set to vi,j = Eo∼A(sj)[v(ri, o)] for (i, j) ∈ [km]× [m].
Definition 5.3. For weights v = [vi,j ](i,j)∈[km]×[m], the entropy regularized matching program for
parameter δ > 0 is:
max
{xi,j}(i,j)∈[km]×[m]
∑
i,j
xi,j vi,j − δ
∑
i,j
xi,j log xi,j,
s.t.
∑
i
xi,j ≤ k ∀j ∈ [m],∑
j
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [km].
The optimal value of this program is denoted OPT(v).
The dual variables for right-hand-side constraints of the matching polytope can be interpreted as
prices for the surrogate outcomes. Given prices, the utility of a replica for a surrogate outcome given
prices is the difference between the replica’s value and the price. The following lemma shows that
for the right choice of dual variables, the maximizer of the entropy regularized matching program
is given by exponential weights with weights equal to the utilities.
Observation 1. For the optimal Lagrangian dual variables α∗ ∈ Rm for surrogate feasibility in the
entropy regularized matching program (Definition 5.3), namely,
α∗ = argminα≥0maxx
{L(x,α) : ∑
j
xi,j ≤ 1 , ∀i
}
where L(x,α) , ∑i,j xi,j vi,j − δ∑i,j xi,j log xi,j +∑j αj(k −∑i xi,j) is the Lagrangian objective
function; the optimal solution x∗ to the primal is given by exponential weights:
x∗i,j =
exp
(
vi,j−α∗i
δ
)
∑
j′ exp
(
vi,j′−α∗j′
δ
) , ∀i, j.
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Observation 1 recasts the entropy regularized matching as, for each replica, sampling from the
distribution of exponential weights. For any replica i and fixed dual variables α our Fast Exponential
Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3) gives a polynomial time algorithm for sampling from the distribution
of exponential weights in the expectations from samples computational model.
Lemma 5.3. For replica i and any prices (dual variables) α ∈ [0, h]m, allocating a surrogate j
drawn from the exponential weights distribution
xi,j =
exp
(
vi,j−αj
δ
)
∑
j′ exp
(
vi,j′−αj′
δ
) , ∀j ∈ [m], (2)
is maximal-in-range, as defined in Definition 4.1, and this random surrogate j can be sampled with
O
(
h4m2 log(hm/δ)
δ4
)
samples from replica-surrogate-outcome value distributions.
Proof. To see that the distribution is maximal-in-range when assigning surrogate outcome j to
replica i, consider the regularized welfare maximization
argmaxx′
∑
j
vi,j x
′
j − δ
∑
j
x′j log x
′
j −
∑
j
αjx
′
j
for replica i. Similar to Observation 1, first-order conditions imply that the exponential weights
distribution in (2) is the unique maximizer of this concave program.
To apply the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race to the utilities, of the form vi,j − αj ∈ [−h, 1],
we must first normalize them to be on the interval [0, 1]. This normalization is accomplished by
adding h to the utilities (which has no effect on the exponential weights distribution, and therefore
preserves maximality-in-range), and then scaling by 1/(h+1). The scaling needs to be corrected by
setting λ in the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3) to (h+1)/δ. The expected number
of samples from the value distributions that are required by the algorithm, per Theorem 3.4, is
O(h4m2 log(hm/δ)δ−4).
If we knew the optimal Lagrangian variables α∗ from Observation 1, it would be sufficient to
define the surrogate selection rule by simply sampling from the exponential weights distribution
(which is polynomial time per Lemma 5.3) that corresponds to the agent’s true type (indexed i∗).
Notice that the wrong values of α correspond to violating primal constraints (for the surrogates)
and thus the outcome from sampling from exponential weights for such α would not correspond to
a maximal-in-range matching. In the next section we give a polynomial time approximation scheme
that is maximal-in-range for each replica and approximates sampling from the correct α∗.
5.3 Online Entropy Regularized Matching
In this section, we reduce the entropy regularized matching problem to the problem of sampling from
exponential weights (as described in Lemma 5.3) via an online algorithm. Consider replicas being
drawn adversarially, but in a random order, over times 1, . . . , km. The basic observation is that
approximate dual variables α are sufficient for an online assignment of each replica to a surrogate
via Lemma 5.3 to approximate the optimal (offline) regularized matching. Recall, the replicas are
independently and identically distributed in the original problem.
Our construction borrows techniques used in designing online algorithms for stochastic online
convex programming problems (Agrawal and Devanur, 2015; Chen and Wang, 2013), and stochas-
tic online packing problems (Agrawal et al., 2009; Devanur et al., 2011; Badanidiyuru et al., 2013;
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Kesselheim et al., 2014). Our online algorithm (Algorithm 4, below) considers the replicas in or-
der, updates the dual variables using multiplicative weight updates based on the current allocation,
and allocates to each agent by sampling from the exponential weights distribution as given by
Lemma 5.3. The algorithm is parameterized by δ, the scale of the regularizer; by η, the rate at
which the algorithm learns the dual variables α; and by scale parameter γ, which we set later.
Algorithm 4 Online Entropy Regularized Matching Algorithm (with parameters δ, η, γ ∈ R+)
1: input: sample access to replica-surrogate matching instance values {vi,j} for replicas i ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}
and surrogates j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
2: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , km} do
3: Let kj be the number of replicas previously matched to each surrogate j and J = {j : kj < k} the
set of surrogates with availability remaining.
4: Set α(i) according to the exonential weights distribution with weights η · kj for available surrogates
j ∈ J (α(i)j = 0 for unavailable surrogates).
5: Match replica i to surrogate j ∈ J drawn according to the exponential weights distribution with
weights (vi,j − γ α(i)j )/δ with the Fast Exponential Bernoulli Race (Algorithm 3).
6: end for
The algorithm needs to satisfy four properties to be useful in a polynomial time reduction. First,
it needs to produce a perfect matching so that the replica-surrogate matching surrogate selection
rule is stationary, specifically via condition (c). Second, it needs to be maximal-in-range for the real
agent (replica i∗). In fact, all replicas are treated symmetrically and allocated by sampling from an
exponential weights distribution that is maximal-in-range via Lemma 5.3. Third, it needs to have
good welfare compared to the ideal matching. Fourth, its runtime needs to be polynomial. The first
two properties are immediate and imply the theorem below. The last two properties are analyzed
below.
Theorem 5.4. The mechanism that maps types to surrogates via the replica-surrogate matching
surrogate selection rule with the online entropy regularized matching algorithm (with payments from
Theorem 4.1) is Bayesian incentive compatible.
5.4 Social Welfare Loss
We analyze the welfare loss of the online entropy regularized matching algorithm (Algorithm 4) with
regularizer parameter δ, learning rate η, and scale parameter γ set as a k-fraction of an estimate of
the value of the offline program (Definition 5.3).
Theorem 5.5. There are parameter settings for online entropy regularized matching algorithm
(Algorithm 4) for which (1) its per-replica expected welfare is within an additive ǫ of the welfare of
the optimal replica surrogate matching, and (2) given oracle access to A, the running time of this
algorithm is polynomial in m and 1/ǫ.
To prove this theorem, we first argue how to set γ to be a constant approximation to the k-
fraction of optimal value of the convex program with high probability, and with efficient sampling.
Second, we argue that the online and offline optimal entropy regularized matching algorithms have
nearly the same welfare. Finally, we argue that the offline optimal entropy regularized matching
has nearly the welfare of the offline optimal matching. The proof of the theorem is then given by
combining these results with the right parameters.
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Parameter γ and approximating the offline optimal. Pre-setting γ to be an estimate of
the optimal objective of the convex program in Definition 5.3 is necessary for the competitive ratio
guarantee of Algorithm 4. Also, γ should be set in a symmetric and incentive compatible way
across replicas, to preserve stationarity property. To this end, we look at an instance generated
by an independent random draw of mk replicas (while fixing the surrogates). In such an instance,
we estimate the expected values by sampling and taking the empirical mean for each edge in the
replica-surrogate bipartite graph. We then solve the convex program exactly (which can be done in
polynomial time using an efficient separation oracle). Obviously, this scheme is incentive compatible
as we do not even use the reported type of true agent in our calculation for γ, and it is symmetric
across replicas. In Appendix D we show how this approach leads to a constant approximation to
the optimal value of the offline program in Definition 5.3 with high probability.
Lemma 5.6. If k = Ω( log(η
−1)
δ2m(logm)2 ), then there exist a polynomial time approximation scheme to
calculate γ (i.e. it only needs polynomial in m, k, δ−1 and η−1 samples to black-box allocation A)
such that
OPT(v)/k ≤ γ ≤ O(1)OPT(v)/k
with probability at least 1− η.
Competitive ratio of the online entropy regularized matching algorithm. Assuming γ
is set to be a constant approximation to the k-fraction of the optimal value of the offline entropy
regularized matching program, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5.7. For a fixed regularizer parameter δ > 0, learning rate η > 0, regularized welfare
estimate γ, and market size m ∈ N that satisfy
m logm
η2
≤ k and OPT(v)/k ≤ γ ≤ O(1)OPT(v)/k ,
the online entropy regularized matching algorithm (Algorithm 4) obtains at least an (1 − O(η))
fraction of the welfare of the optimal entropy regularized matching (Definition 5.3).
Proof. Recall that OPT(v) denotes the optimal objective value of the entropy regularized matching
program. We will analyze the algorithm up to the iteration τ that the first surrogate becomes
unavailable (because all k copies are matched to previous replicas).
Define the contribution of replica i to the Lagrangian objective of Observation 1 for allocation
xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,m) and dual variables α as
L(i)(xi,α) ,
∑
j
vi,j xi,j − δ
∑
j
xi,j log xi,j +
∑
j
γαj(
1
m − xi,j). (3)
The difference between the outcome for replica i in the online algorithm and the solution to the offline
optimization is that the algorithm selects the outcome with respect to dual variables γα(i) while the
offline algorithm selects the outcome with respect to the optimal dual variables α∗ (Observation 1).
Denote the outcome of the online algorithm by
xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,m) = argmaxx′i∈∆m L
(i)(x′i, γα
(i)) ,
and its contribution to the objective by
ALGi ,
∑
j
vi,j xi,j − δ
∑
j
xi,j log xi,j .
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Likewise for the outcome of the offline optimization by x∗i and OPTi. Denote by xˆi the indicator
vector for the online algorithm sampling from xi.
Optimality of xi for dual variables γα(i) in equation (3) implies
ALGi +
∑
j
γα
(i)
j
(
1
m − xi,j
) ≥ OPTi+∑
j
γα
(i)
j
(
1
m − x∗i,j
)
so, by rearranging the terms and taking expectations conditioned on the observed history, we have
E[ALGi | Hi−1] ≥ γE
[
α(i) · xi | Hi−1
]
+E[OPTi | Hi−1]− γE
[
α(i) · x∗i | Hi−1
]
= E[OPTi]− γα(i) ·E[x∗i ] + γα(i) · xˆi − (E[OPTi]−E[OPTi | Hi−1])
+ γα(i) · (E[x∗i ]−E[x∗i | Hi−1]) + γα(i) · (E[xi | Hi−1]− xˆi)
≥ 1
mk
OPT(v) + γα(i) · (xˆi − 1
m
1)− Li − L′i
where
Li , γ α
(i).(xˆi −E[xi|Hi−1]) ,
L′i , |(E[r∗i ]−E[r∗i |Hi−1]|+ γ‖E[x∗i ]−E[x∗i |Hi−1]‖ .
By summing the above inequalities for i = 1 : τ − 1 we have:
τ−1∑
i=1
E[ALGi|Hi−1] ≥ τ − 1
mk
OPT(v) + γ
τ−1∑
i=1
α(i) · (xˆi − 1
m
1)−
τ−1∑
i=1
(Li + L
′
i) (4)
In order to bound the term γ
∑τ−1
i=1 α
(i) · (xˆi− 1m1), let gi(α) , α · (xˆi− 1m1). Then, by applying the
regret bound of exponential gradient (or essentially multiplicative weight update) online learning
algorithm for any realization of random variables {xˆi} (which will result in α(i) to be the exponential
weights distributions with weights η · kj), we have
τ−1∑
i=1
gi(α
(i)) ≥ (1− η) max
‖α‖1≤1,α≥0
τ−1∑
i=1
gi(α)− logm
η
≥ (1− η)(k − τ − 1
m
)− logm
η
(5)
where the last inequality holds because at the time τ−1, either there exists j such that∑τ−1i=1 xˆi,j = k,
or τ − 1 = mk and all surrogate outcome budgets are exhausted. In the former case, we have
max
‖α‖1≤1,α≥0
τ−1∑
i=1
gi(α) ≥
τ−1∑
i=1
gi(ej) ≥ k − τ − 1
m
,
and in the latter case we have
max
‖α‖1≤1,α≥0
τ−1∑
i=1
gi(α) ≥ 0 ≥ k − τ − 1
m
.
Combining (4) and (5), letting Qi = Li + L′i, and assuming xˆj = 0 for j ≥ τ , we have:
mk∑
i=1
E[ALGi|Hi−1] ≥
τ−1∑
i=1
E[ALGi|Hi−1] ≥ τ − 1
mk
OPT(v) + γ(1− η)(k − τ − 1
m
)− γ logm
η
−
τ−1∑
i=1
Qi
≥ τ − 1
mk
OPT(v) +
OPT(v)
k
(1− η)(k − τ − 1
m
)−O(1) ·OPT(v) logm
kη
−
mk∑
i=1
Qi
≥ (1− η)OPT(v)−O(η) ·OPT(v) −
mk∑
i=1
Qi (6)
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where the last inequality holds simply because k > logm
η2
. By taking expectations from both sides,
we have
E[ALG] ≥ (1−O(η)) ·OPT(v) −
mk∑
i=1
(E[Li] +E
[
L′i
]
) (7)
We now bound each term separately. Define Yi ,
∑
i′≤i Li. Note that E[Yi − Yi−1|Hi−1] = 0, and
therefore sequence {Yi} forms a martingale. Now, by using concentration of martingales we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8. E
[∑mk
i=1 Li
]
≤ γO(√km log km).
Proof of Lemma 5.8. Sequence {Yi}mki=1 forms a martingale, as E[Yi − Yi−1|Hi−1] = 0 and using
Cauchy-Schwarz
|Yi − Yi−1| = γ|α(i) · (xˆi −E[xi|Hi−1])| ≤ γ‖α(i)‖ · ‖xˆi −E[xi|Hi−1]‖ ≤ 2γ.
By using Azuma’s inequality, we have
Pr{|Ymk| ≥ t} ≤ exp
(− t2
4kmγ2
)
.
Let t = γ
√
2km log (km), then Pr{|Ymk| ≥ γ
√
2km log (km)} ≤ 1√
km
. Therefore,
E
[∑mk
i=1
Li
]
≤ E[|Ymk|] ≤ γ
√
2km log (km) + 1√
km
· 2γkm = γO(
√
km log km).
To bound the second term, we use an argument based on Lemma 4.1 in Agrawal and Devanur
(2015). In fact, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.9. E
[∑mk
i=1 L
′
i
]
≤ γO(√k logm).
Proof of Lemma 5.9. Using Lemma 4.1 in Agrawal and Devanur (2015) with S = {v ∈ Rm : v ≤
1
m1}, we have E
[∑mk
i=1 L
′
i
]
≤ γO(√skm logm) where s = maxv∈S maxj∈[m] vj . Obviously, s = 1m ,
which completes the proof.
Using Lemmas 5.9 and 5.8, combined with the facts that γ ≤ O(1) · OPT(v)k and k ≥ m logmη2 ,
we have E
[∑mk
i=1 Li + L
′
i
]
≤ O(η)OPT(v). Together with (7), we conclude that E[ALG] ≥ (1 −
O(η))OPT(v). This holds conditioned on OPT(v)k ≤ γ ≤ O(1) · OPT(v)k . Moreover, γ is calculated
by sampling such that this event happens with probability at least (1 − η), which completes the
proof.
Lemma 5.10. With parameter δ ≥ 0 the welfare (average for the replicas) of the optimal entropy
regularized matching is within an additive δ logm of the welfare of the optimal matching.
Proof. The entropy −∑i,j xi,j log xi,j is non-negative and maximized with xi,j = 1/m. The max-
imum value of the entropy term is thus δmk logm. The optimal objective value of the entropy
regularized matching exceeds that of the optimal matching; thus, its welfare is within an additvie
δmk logm of the optimal matching. The average welfare per replica in the entropy regularized
matching (recall, there are mk replicas) is within δ logm of the average welfare per replica on the
optimal matching.
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We conclude the section by combining Lemmas 5.6, 5.7, and 5.10 to prove the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Let δ = ǫ3 · 1logm and η = ǫ3 · 1c , where c is a constant such that competitive
ratio of Algorithm 4 is at least 1 − c · η (Lemma 5.7). Moreover, let k = m logmη2 = O(m logmǫ2 ),
to satisfy the required condition in Lemma 5.7. The per-replica welfare of Algorithm 4 is within
an additive δ logm = ǫ/3 of its entropy regularized matching objective value, which in turn is
a 1 − c · η = 1 − ǫ/3 approximation to the per-replica optimal value of the entropy regularized
matching due to Lemma 5.6 and 5.7. Following Lemma 5.10, the per-replica optimal value of the
entropy regularized matching is within an additive δ logm = ǫ/3 of the per-replica expected welfare
of the optimal matching. As the per-replica welfare is bounded by 1, the per-replica welfare of the
Algorithm 4 is within an additive ǫ/3 + ǫ/3 + ǫ/3 = ǫ of the per-replica expected welfare of the
optimal matching, as claimed. Finally, due to Lemma 5.6 and the fact that k is polynomial in m
and 1/ǫ, the algorithm’s running time is polynomial in m and 1/ǫ.
5.5 Approximation Scheme for the Ideal Model and Black-box Reductions
We summarize the approximation scheme for the ideal model of Hartline et al. (2015), described
and proved in previous sections, by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.11. There is an BIC approximation scheme for the ideal m-to-m replica-surrogate
reduction: Given any algorithm A, market size m, and loss tollerance ǫ, there is a mechanism
that (a) is Bayesian incentive compatible, (b) has per-agent no more than a polynomial in m and
1/ǫ number of elementary operations and black-box calls to the algorithm A, and (c) has per-agent
expected welfare that is at least additive ǫ of that of the mechanism for the ideal m-to-m replica-
surrogate reduction for A.
As an example application of Theorem 5.11, we apply it to one of the settings considered
by Hartline et al. (2015). The result of this application of the theorem is a mechanism that has
per-agent welfare within ǫ of that of an original non-monotone algorithm A. The following definition
and theorem can be found in Hartline et al. (2015).
Definition 5.4 (e.g., Hartline et al., 2015). The doubling dimension of a metric space is the smallest
constant ∆ such that every bounded subset S can be partitioned into at most 2 subsets, each having
diameter at most half of the diameter of S.
Theorem 5.12 (Hartline et al., 2015). For any agent with type space with doubling dimension
∆ ≥ 2 and algorithm A, if
m ≥ 1
2ǫ∆+1
then the mechanism from the ideal model m-to-m replica-surrogate reduction has per-agent welfare
that is at least an additive 2ǫ of the the algorithm’s per-agent welfare.
We now have the following immediate corollary by combining Theorem 5.11 with Theorem 5.12.
Corollary 5.13. For n agents, type spaces with doubling dimension bounded by ∆, and any algo-
rithm A, there is a mechanism that (a) is Bayesian incentive compatible, (b) has per-agent expected
welfare that is at least an additive ǫ of the expected welfare of A, and (c) has polynomial runtime in
ǫ−∆−1 and n, given access to black-box oracle A and samples from the agents’ type distributions.
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A Implicit Payment Computation
In this section we describe one standard reduction for computing implicit payments in our gen-
eral setting, given access to a BIC allocation algorithm A˜: a multi-parameter counterpart of
the single-parameter payment computation procedure used for example by Archer et al. (2004);
Hartline and Lucier (2010), which makes n + 1 calls to A˜, thus incurring a factor n + 1 overhead
in running time. A different implicit payment computation procedure, described in Babaioff et al.
(2013, 2015), avoids this overhead by calling A˜ only once in expectation, but incurs a 1− ǫ loss in
expected welfare and potentially makes payments of magnitude Θ(1/ǫ) from the mechanism to the
agents.
The implicit payment computation procedure assumes that the agents’ type spaces (T k)k∈[n]
are star-convex at 0, meaning that for any agent k, any type tk ∈ T k, and any scalar λ ∈ [0, 1],
there is another type λtk ∈ T k with the property that v(λtk, o) = λv(tk, o) for every o ∈ O. (The
assumption is without loss of generality, as argued in the next paragraph.) The implicit payment
computation procedure, applied to type profile t, samples λ ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random and
computes outcomes o0 , A˜(t) as well as ok , A˜(λtk, t−k) for all k ∈ [n]. The payment charged to
agent k is v(tk, o0)− v(tk, ok). Note that, in expectation, agent k pays
pk(t) = v(tk, A˜(t))−
∫ 1
0
v(tk, A˜(λtk, t−k)) dλ,
in accordance with the payment identity for multi-parameter BIC mechanisms when type spaces
are star-convex at 0; see Babaioff et al. (2013) for a discussion of this payment identity.
Finally, let us justify the assumption that T k is star-convex for all k. This assumption is without
loss of generality for the allocation algorithms A˜ that arise from the RSM reduction, because we
can enlarge the type space T k if necessary by adjoining types of the form λtk with tk ∈ T k and
0 ≤ λ < 1. Although the output of the original allocation algorithm A may be undefined when its
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input type profile includes one of these artifically-adjoined types, the RSM reduction never inputs
such a type into A. It only calls A on profiles of surrogate types sampled from the type-profile
distribution F , whose support excludes the artificially-adjoined types. Thus, even when the input
to A˜ includes an artifically-adjoined type λtk, it occurs as one of the replicas in the reduction. The
behavior of algorithm A˜ remains well-defined in this case, because replicas are only used as inputs
to the valuation function v(ri, oj), whose output is well-defined even when ri = λtk for λ < 1.
B Basic Notions of Bayesian Mechanism Design
Multi-parameter Bayesian setting. Suppose there are n agents, where agent k has private type
tk from type space T k. The type profile of all agents is denoted by t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T 1 × . . .×T n.
Moreover, we assume types are drawn independently from known prior distributions. For agent k,
let F k be the distribution of tk ∈ T k and F = F 1 × . . . × Fn be the joint distribution of types.
Suppose there is an outcome space denoted by O. Agent k with type tk has valuation v(tk, o) for
outcome o ∈ O, where v : (T 1∪ . . .∪T n)×O → [0, 1] is a fixed function. Note that we assume agent
values are non-negative and bounded, and w.l.o.g in [0, 1]. Finally, we allow charging agents with
non-negative money payments and we assume agents are quasi-linear, i.e. an agent with private
type t has utility u = v(t, o)− p for the outcome-payment pair (o, p).
Algorithms, mechanisms and interim rules. An allocation algorithm A is a mapping from
type profiles t to outcome space O. A (direct revelation) mechanism M is a pair of allocation rule
and payment rule (A,p), in which A is an allocation algorithm and p = (p1, . . . , pn) where each pk
(denoted by the payment rule for agent k) is a mapping from type profiles t to R+. In fact, one
can think of the interaction between strategic agents and a mechanism as following: agents submit
their reported types s = (s1, . . . , sn) and then the mechanism M picks the outcome o = A(s) and
charges each agent k with its payment pk(s). We also consider interim allocation rule, which is
the allocation from the perspective of one agent when the other agent’s types are drawn from their
prior distribution. More concretely, we abuse notation and define Ak(sk) , A(sk, t−k) to be the
distribution over outcomes induced by A when agent k’s type is sk and other agent types are drawn
from F−k. Similarly, for agent k we define interim payment rule pk(sk) , Et−k∼F−k
[
pk(sk, t−k)
]
,
and interim value vk(sk) , Et−k∼F−k
[
v(sk,Ak(sk, t−k))]. In most parts of this paper, we focus
only on one agent, e.g. agent k, and we just work with the interim allocation algorithm Ak(.).
When it is clear from the context, we drop the agent’s superscript, and therefore A(s) denotes the
distribution over outcomes induced by A(s, t−k) when t−k ∼ F−k.
Bayesian and dominant strategy truthfulness. We are only interested in designing mech-
anisms that are interim truthful, i.e. every agent bests of by reporting her true type assuming
all other agent’s reported types are drawn independently from their prior type distribution. More
precisely, a mechanism M is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if for all agents k, and all types
sk, tk ∈ T k,
Et−k∼F−k
[
v(tk,Ak(tk))
]
− pk(tk) ≥ Et−k∼F−k
[
v(tk,Ak(sk))
]
− pk(sk) (8)
As a stronger notion of truthfulness than Bayesian truthfulness, one can consider dominant strategy
truthfulness.More precisely, a mechanism M is Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) if
for all agents k, and all types sk, tk ∈ T k and all types t−k ∈ T −k,
v(tk,A(t))− pk(t) ≥ v(tk,A(sk, t−k))− pk(sk, t−k) (9)
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Moreover, an allocation algorithm A˜ is said to be BIC (or DSIC) if there exists a payment rule p˜
such that M˜ = (A˜, p˜) is a BIC (or DSIC) mechanism. Throughout the paper, we use the terms
Bayesian (or dominant strategy) truthful and Bayesian (or dominant strategy) incentive compatible
interchangeably. For randomized mechanisms, DSIC and BIC solution concepts are defined by
considering expectation of utilities of agents over mechanism’s internal randomness.
Social welfare. We are considering mechanism design for maximizing social welfare, i.e. the sum
of the utilities of agents and the mechanism designer. For quasi-linear agents, this quantity is in fact
sum of the valuations of the agents under the outcome picked by the mechanism. For the allocation
algorithm A, we use the notation val(A) for the expected welfare of this allocation and valk(A)
for the expected value of agent k under this allocation, i.e. val(A) , Et∼F
[∑
k v(t
k,A(t))] and
valk(A) , Et∼F
[
v(tk,A(t))].
C Surrogate Selection and BIC Reduction
Lemma C.1. If matching algorithm M(r, s) produces a perfect k-to-1 matching for the instance in
Definition 5.2, then its corresponding surrogate selection rule, denoted by ΓM , is stationary
Proof. Each surrogate sj is an i.i.d. sample from F . Moreover, by the principle of deferred decisions
the index i∗ (the real agent’s index in the replica type profile) is a uniform random index in [mk],
even after fixing the matching. Since this choice of replica is uniform in [mk] and M is a perfect
k-to-1 matching, the selection of surrogate outcome is uniform in [m], and therefore the selection
of surrogate type associated with this outcome is also uniform in [m]. As a result, the output
distribution of the selected surrogate type is F .
Lemma C.2. If M(r, s) is a feasible replica-surrogate k-to-1 matching and is a truthful allocation
rule (in expectation over allocation’s random coins) for all replicas (i.e. assuming each replica
is a rational agent, no replica has any incentive to misreport), then the composition of ΓM and
interim allocation algorithm A(.) forms a BIC allocation algorithm for the original mechanism
design problem.
Proof. Each replica-agent i ∈ [mk] (including the real agent i∗) bests off by reporting her true
replica type under some proper payments. Now, consider an agent in the original mechanism design
problem with true type t. For any given surrogate type profile s, using the ΓM -reduction the
agent receives the same outcome distribution as the one he gets matched to in M in a Bayesian
sense, simply because of stationary property of ΓM (Lemma C.1). As allocation M is incentive
compatible, this agent doesn’t benefit from miss-reporting her true type as long as the value he
receives for reporting t′ is v(t,A(ΓM (t′))). Therefore conditioning on s and non-real replicas in r,
the final allocation is BIC from the perspective of this agent. The lemma then follows by averaging
over the random choice of s and non-real agent replicas in r.
D Estimating the Offline Optimal Regularized Matching
To formalize the approximation scheme, first fix the surrogate type profile s. For a given replica
profile r and replica-surrogate edge (i, j), let vi,j(ri) = E[v(ri,A(sj))] and vˆi,j(ri) be the empirical
mean of N samples of the random variable v(ri,A(sj). Suppose v(r) and vˆ(r) be the corresponding
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vectors of expected values and empirical means under replica profile r. Now, draw r′ indepen-
dently at random from the distribution of r. We now show that OPT(vˆ(r′)) is a constant-factor
approximation to OPT(v(r)) with high probability, and therefore we can use OPT(vˆ(r′)) to set γ.
We prove this in two steps. In Lemma D.1 we show for a given r′, OPT(vˆ(r′)) is a constant-
factor approximation to OPT(v(r′)) with high probability over the randomness in {A(sj)}. Then,
in Lemma D.3 we show if r and r′ are two random independent draws from the replica profile
distribution then OPT(v(r′)) is a constant-factor approximation to OPT(v(r)) with high probability
over randomness in r and r′. These two pieces together prove our claim.
Lemma D.1. If N ≥ 2 log(4m2k·η−1)δ2(logm)2 , then 1/2 · OPT(v(r′)) ≤ OPT(vˆ(r′)) ≤ 2OPT(v(r′)) with
probability at least 1− η/2.
Proof. By using the standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bound together with the union bound, with prob-
ability at least 1− 2m2ke− δ
2(logm)2·N
2 ≥ 1− η/2 we have
∀(i, j) ∈ [km]× [m] : |vˆi,j(r′i)− vi,j(r′i)| ≤ 1/2 · δ logm
Suppose x∗ is the optimal solution of the regularized matching convex program with values v(r′)
and x∗∗ is the optimal solution with values vˆ(r′).
OPT(vˆ(r′)) =
∑
i
(x∗∗i · vˆi + δH(x∗∗i )) ≥
∑
i
(x∗i · vˆi + δH(x∗i ))
≥
∑
i
(x∗i · vi + δH(x∗i ))−
δkm logm
2
= OPT(v(r′))− δkm logm
2
≥ 1/2 ·OPT(v(r′))
where the last inequality holds as OPT(v(r′)) is bounded below by the value of the uniform allo-
cation, i.e. OPT(v(r′)) ≥ δ ·mk log(m). Similarly, one can show OPT(v(r′)) ≥ 1/2 · OPT(vˆ(r′)),
which completes the proof.
Before proving the second step, we prove the following lemma, which basically shows that the
optimal value of regularized matching OPT(v(·)) is a 1-Lipschitz multivariate function.
Lemma D.2. For every i ∈ [km], replica profile r, and replica type r′i we have:
|OPT(v(ri, r−i))−OPT(v(r′i, r−i))| ≤ 1
Proof. Let x and x′ be the optimal assignments in OPT(v(ri, r−i)) and OPT(v(r′i, r−i)) respectively.
We have
OPT(v(ri, r−i)) =
∑
l
(xl · vl(rl) + δH(xl)) ≥
∑
l 6=i
(x′l · vl(rl) + δH(x′l)) + x′i · vi(ri) + δH(x′i)
≥
∑
l 6=i
(x′l · vl(rl) + δH(x′l)) + x′i · vi(r′i) + δH(x′i)− 1 = OPT(v(r′i, r−i))− 1
where the last inequality holds because x′i · (vi(r′i) − vi(ri)) ≤ 1. Similarly, OPT(v(r′i, r−i)) ≥
OPT(v(ri, r−i))− 1 by switching the roles of ri and r′i.
Lemma D.3. If k ≥ 32 log(8η−1)
δ2m(logm)2
, then 1/2 · OPT(v(r)) ≤ OPT(v(r′)) ≤ 3/2 · OPT(v(r)) with
probability at least 1− η/2.
23
Proof. We start by defining the following Doob martingale sequence (Motwani and Raghavan, 2010),
where (conditional) expectations are taken over the randomness in replica profile r :
X0 = E[OPT(v(r))]
Xn = E[OPT(v(r))|r1, · · · , rn] , n = 1, 2, . . . , km
It is easy to check that E[Xn|r1, . . . , rn−1] = Xn−1, and therefore {Xn} forms a martingale se-
quence with respect to {rn}. Moreover, |Xn − Xn−1| ≤ 1 because of Lemma D.2. Now, by using
Azuma–Hoeffding bound for martingales, we have
Pr {|Xkm −X0| ≥ δkm log(m)/4} ≤ 2e
−kmδ2(logm)2
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and thus with probability at least 1 − 2e−kmδ
2(logm)2
32 , |OPT(v(r)) − E[OPT(v(r))]| ≤ δkm log(m)4 .
Similarly, with probability at least 1 − 2e−kmδ
2(logm)2
32 , we have |OPT(v(r′)) − E[OPT(v(r′))]| ≤
δkm log(m)
4 . Note that OPT(v(r)) and OPT(v(r
′)) are identically distributed, and in particular
they have the same expectation. Therefore with probability at least 1 − 4e−kmδ
2(logm)2
32 we have
|OPT(v(r)) − OPT(v(r′))| ≤ δkm log(m)2 . By using the lower bound of δkm log(m) for OPT(v(r))
(due to uniform assignment), we conclude that with probability at least 1−4e−kmδ
2(logm)2
32 ≥ 1−η/2
we have the following, as desired:
1/2 ·OPT(v(r)) ≤ OPT(v(r′)) ≤ 3/2 ·OPT(v(r)).
Corollary D.4. If N ≥ 2 log(4m2k·η−1)
δ2(logm)2
and k ≥ 32 log(8η−1)
δ2m(logm)2
, then γ = 4k OPT(vˆ(r
′)) satisfies
1/k ·OPT(v(r)) ≤ γ ≤ 12/k ·OPT(v(r)) ,
with probability at least 1− η.
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